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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
)

JESS W. PICKETT,

)

Plaintiff/Appellant,

)

)
)

vs.

Case No. 16627

)

)

CALIFORNIA PACIFIC UTILITIES,
)
a California corporation, and
)
THE COUNTY OF IRON, a political )
subdivision of the State of Utah,)
Defendants/Respondents.

)

)

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-)

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action by the Plaintiff to estop the COUNTY
OF IRON, a political subdivision of the State of Utah from
expanding or modifying a public thoroughfare acquired by a
prescriptive right to allow a private person or legal entity
by franchise to use property of the Plaintiff's

for

personal

profit and requesting that the Defendant, CALIFOINIA·PACIFIC
remove their pole line property from that land n0w i:nffied by
the Plaintiff in fee.
This is an appeal from an action brought before the Fifth
Judicial District Court for Iron County, State of Utah.

The

Plaintiff, alleged that the Defendant UTILITY COMPANY, did
trespass upon his property and continues such trespass after
having erected power poles and stringing transmission lines.

Said
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power poles and transmission lines interfere with
right to full enjoyment and use of his fee.

Plaintiff's~

Specifically,

the structures present a dangerous hazard of electrocution
to the Plaintiff as he conducts his agricultural irrigation
operat,ion through the use of sprinkler pipes.

The poles and

lines being so close as to present an obstruction when the
sprinkler pipes are moved from located to location within the,
Plaintiff's fields.
Furthermore, Defendant UTILITY COMPANY erected the power
poles and transmission lines along a right-of-way over the
Plaintiff's fee which was acquired through adverse

prescripti~

Under operation of the laws of the State of Utah, such an
easement or right-of-way becomes a public thoroughfare for
transportation of people and livestock.

By Defendant's action
I

they imposed an additional use upon the easement thus creatinii
an additional servitude upon the servient estate whose title
is now held by the Plaintiff.

Such additional burden constitutl

a taking of the Plaintiff's property which was without just
compensation to the Plaintiff, thereby depriving him of due
~rocess

of law as guaranteed by the constitution of the

United States of America and the constitution of the State of
Utah.
The questions therefore before this Court are as follows:
Should an abutting land owner incur an additional burden
upon his fee from an additional use of a public right-of-way
by a company for its own commercial purposes without compensal
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
2
Library Services and Technology Act, administered
by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Does an abutting land owner have no course of relief
for damage as a result of a power company erecting power

.I

poles and transmission lines upon a public right-of-way or
easement in which the abutting landowner has the fee?
May a power company enter into a highway and occupy
and portion thereof, without consent of the landowner, when
such entry is not

~or

a purpose incidental to the use of the

highway by the public for travel?
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case was tried to the court.
Defendants.

Judgment was granted to

The Court ruling that the placement of a powec line

enchances the public use of a prescriptive easement, was a
benefit to the public, and was included within the public
easement for travel obtained by prescription.

Judgment was

granted with prejudice.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks an Order of this Court reversing the
Judgment of the Trial Court and ordering Defendants,
CALIFORNIA PACIFIC to remove their pole line property from the
property of the Plaintiffs and that the Plaintiff be awarded
damages for the period of time that the Defendant, CALIFORNIA
PACIFIC has trespassed upon the property of the Plaintiffs and
until same is removed from the Plaintiff's property; and cost
of this action incurred by the Plaintiff as determined by
this Court; and that the COUNTY OF IRON be estopped from

3
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further expansion or modification of public thoroughfares
acquired by prescriptive right without authorization of the
legal abutting owner.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff is the owner of the Northeast quarter of the
Northeast quarter, Section 7, Township 34 South, Range 9
West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian and said fact was

stipulated~
I

by the parties hereto, (T 6, 10-15).

On or about January 26,

1976, the Defendant, CALIFORNIA PACIFIC did place their power ,
pole line on and over the property of the Plaintiffs for
personal profit (T 28, 14-17).
The COUNTY OF IRON previously acquired a prescriptive

~.·

right-of-way for public use in the nature of vehicular traffic i
and that of driving livestock over said property has been
used by the general public and was stipulated to and shown in '

~

the record (T 8, 4-13).
Prior to the installation of the pole line by the Defendanj
CALIFORNIA PACIFIC, the Plaintiff did notify said Defendant

~

on January 22, 1976 that the Plaintiff was the fee owner of

'

said property and that an easement authorized by the Plaintiffl
would be required to construct the power line on said property
(T 28 17-22), and the Defendant, CALIFORNIA PACIFIC did in
fact place their pole line on said property on or about

Janualii

26, 1976 without authorization by the Plaintiff, (T 28, 14-17).

4 provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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,
The Defendant, CALIFORNIA PACIFIC built said line to
replace a line that existed on neighboring property for a
benefit to the neighboring property (T 13, 16-28), and said
line could have crossed the roadway at the end of the existing
line (T 14, 18-26) and does in fact cross the roadway at the
west end of the pole line in question and said line could
have been built on the south side of said right-of-way (Map,
T 15, 10-19).
Said line as placed over said property in question does
create a hazard to the Plaintiff (T 36, 9-22), and said power
line could have crossed the right-of-way at the serviae pole
of the Plaintiffs and could have been installed on the eoeth
side of the roadway on the neighboring property for

~-e

benefit the old original line was removed (T 37, 1-5).
The service pole installed for the benefit of the Plaiatiff
(T 35, 11-20) does have cross arms that extend over thie fence
and over the property of the Plaintiff, and the newly
constructed line extending west to the first pole of the mew
construction does cross over the fence of the Plaintiff
thereby encroaching on to the property of the Plaintiff (T 35,
5-15, T 42, 30, T 43, 1).
POIN.1._L
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTEED REVERSIBLE ERROR
WHEN IT RULED THAT THE COUNTY COULD AUTHORIZE
PERMANENT INSTALLATION OF POLES AND POWER LINES
OVER A PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENT FOR PUBLIC TRAVEL,
THEREBY EXPANDING AND MODIFYING SAME BEYOND
U.C.A. 17-5-39 (1953, as amended).

ponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Service
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The brief of the Defendant the COUNTY OF IRON to the
Trial Court in relying on U.C.A. 17-5-39 (1953, as amended)
authorizing a permanent installation, failed to cite any
precedent as to a prescriptive right-of-way within this State
or any sister state.

To date, the only reference on a

similar matter was White v. Salt Lake City, 121 U. 134, 239
P. 2d 210, and this matter pertained to a dedicated right-of-way
by reason of a platted map being filed as a subdivision, and
this Court ruled that the fee rested with the County when said
property was dedicated.

Counsel for the COUNTY OF IRON states

that such an act is authorized by IMPLICATION, but without
authority or precedent this can only be an assumption on the
part of counsel.
The Plaintiff in his original brief to the Trial Court
did refer to White v. Salt Lake City and the fact that this
Court dealt with the question of dedication of the entire fee.·
The Plaintiff also cited other precedent that concerned itself
with similar circumstances to this action of a prescriptive
right-of-way from other states with the rulings vesting
the fee to the abutting owner subject only to the right-of-way
for public thoroughfare.

It was found by the Courts that

conduits of public utilities or foreign municipalities which di
not serve the abutting property constitute an additional servit
is borne out by the following authorities:

Sterling's Appe~.

1886, 111 PA. 35, 2A. 105; Kincaid v. Indianapolis Natural~

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization
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Co., 1890 124 Ind. 577, 24NE. 1066, 8 L.R.A. 602; Ward v.
Triple State Natural Gas & Oil Co., 1903, 24 Ky. Law Rep. 116,
74 S.W. 709; Van Brunt v. Town of Flatbush, 1891, 128 N.Y. 50,
27 N.E. 973; and Hofius v. Carneghie-Illinois Steel Corp.
1946, 146 Ohio St. 574, 67 N.E. 2nd 429.

The rule announced

in these cases is that abutting property owners have a right
in the roadway paramount to all uses except public travel, and
additional servitudes cannot be imposed without payment of
compensation, Kincaid v. Indianapolis Natural Gas Co., supra.
The ruling in Cathey v. Arkansas Power & Light Co., 1'36
193 Ark. 92, 97 S.W. 2nd 624 stated that:
"A land owner is entitled to compensation for
additional servitudes that may be placed upon
the servient estate. Such would be the case
if the highway is used for the erection of
poles and the stringing of wires for the
tramsmission of electricity where the original
burden was merely for highway purpose."
In trial, the Court determined that a
the property was created over 50 years ago.

right~of-way

over

Title to the land

and right-of-way passed through owners until coming to res.t
in the hand of Plaintiff.

While title to the servient estate

remains in the Plaintiff, the public has a right-of-way for
travel over the easement.

The Trial Court erroneously ruled

that Defendant, CALIFORNIA PACIFIC also had perfected a right to
use the road for commercial transmission of their energy,
without affording any compensation to the Plaintiff.
The Trial Court determined the utility could, with

7
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impunity, erect power poles and string transmission lines.
Perhaps the court did so as it considered the use of the
easement by the UTILITY COMPANY to be incidental to the
established use of the highway by the public for travel.
Alternatively, the Trial Court considered that the COUNTY
OF IRON could confer such a right upon the Defendant,
CALIFORNIA PACIFIC, to establish such an obstruction under
the language of U.C.A. 17-5-39 (1953, as amended).

In either

case, the Trial Court erred.
At one time the courts would consider the distinction be[l
uses indigenous to urban roads and uses indigenous to rural

r~

Montgomery v. Santa Ana Electric Railroad Co., 104 Cal 186,
37 P 786; Dooly Block v. Salt Lake R.T. Co., 9 Utah 31, 33
P 229.

Now the trend is away from making such a distinction

between types of roads.

Rather, as in Palmer v. Larchmont

Electrical Co. , 52 N. E. 1093; ancillary fixtures such as water
mains, gas pipelines, electrical transmission lines, or light
poles have a relationship to the highway in either one of two
manners, (1) those uses directly related to use of the
thoroughfare by the public; and (2) those uses not directly
related to public use of and travel upon the thoroughfare.
In the matter at hand, the original use of the easement or
right-of-way, was for public travel by people and livestock
only.

(T 8, 4-13).

8
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Extending the logic of such an objective or a highway
purpose, sewers or culverts drain surface water from the
road, thus relieving the highway from impairments.

Therefore,

sewers or culverts are for valid highway purposes.

Water

mains may be used to supply water to clean and sprinkle streets.
Light poles may aid in night travel upon highways.

Such

burdens upon an easement are both used for highway purposes and
municipal purposes, which are incident to the highway purposes.
Not so with telegraph, telephone or power wires and poles.
They are not related to preserve in travel upon the street,
road or highway along which such wires are strung.
Addressing such a dichotomy in manner of highway uses by
utility companies is Carpenter v. Capitol Electric, 173 Ill
29, 52 N.E. 973.

The court there recognized in that the

erection of poles and wires by an electric company, not for
the purpose of lighting public ways and places, but for the
purposes of supplying light to individual and firms in the
transaction of its own corporate and commercial business,
constituted an additional burden or servitude upon the servient
tenement, for which the owner of the same may demand and
receive compensation.
Even in jurisdiction still recognizing the distinction
between rural roads and urban roads, occupation of a rural
highway, the fee of which belongs to the abutting owner and by
the telegraph company for the erection of its poles and

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization
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transmission lines, is an additional burden to the easement
for a highway, for which the owners of the fee are entitled
to compensation.

Eels v. American Telephone and Telegraph

Co. 143 NY 133, 38 N.E. 202.
In the final analysis, whether the use of the easement in
question by the Utility Company is incidental to the use of tb;
highway by the public for travel, some jurisdictions have held
although the poles and wires are reasonably necessary and
proper for lighting the right-of-way, their further use for
the furnishing of electricity to private parties is unauthorizl
Gurnsey v. Northern California Power Co., 160 Cal 699, 117 P

906; French v. Robb, 67 NJL 260; 51 A 509.

In the instant

case, the power line is not used for lighting or any roadrelated purpose.
Relevant to the issue of a local municipality conferring
the right of the Utility Company to enter onto the easement
for the purposes of erecting poles and stringing lines is
Gurnsey v. Northern California Power Co., supra.

In this

instance the land was dedicated to the public for a highway
while the owner retained his right to the soil for all purpose:
not inconsistent with the public's easement.

The only control

which the County Board of Supervisors could exercise was such
as was necessary to maintain the highway in a proper condition
for use by the public.

Hence, a municipality embracing the

highway could not confer on a third person the right to enter;

ponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization
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on the highway and occupy any portion thereof, without the
consent of the landowner, when such entry was not for a
purpose incidental to the effective use of the highway by
the public for travel.
In conclusion, a fundamental principle which is basic
to the use of all easements, is that the owner of the easement
cannot increase the burden upon the servient estate or impose
thereon a new burden.

Duet v. Louisiana Power and Light Co.,

169 F Supp 184; Wall v. Rudolph, 198 Cal App 684, 18 Cal Rptr 123,
3 ALR 3d 1242; Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Co. v. Moyle, 109
Utah 213; 17 5 P2d 148, ALR 17 5; Haines v. Golles, 76 WY 411,
303 P2d 1004, Likewise, Davis v. Jefferson Co. Tel. Co.;
82 WVA 357, 95 SE 1042; it has been widely held that erecting
electric light poles and wires over and along a right-of-way
constitutes a new and additional burden upon the abutting fee
and is an obstruction in one way or another, Carpenter v.
Capitol Electric, supra; Crullen v. Edison Electric Illumination
Co., 254 Mass 93, 149 NE 665.
It has been widely held that electric light and power lines
in a public street or highway, so placed for the power company's
connnercial and corporate purposes of furnishing electric current
to private individuals or concerns, do constitute an additional
servitude or easement for the owner of the abutting property.
Gurnsey v. Northern California Power Co., supra Carpenter v.
Capitol Electric Co., supra; Potomac Edison Co. v. Routlahn,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization
provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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192 Md 449, 65 A2D 580; Berry v. Southern Pine Electric
Power Assn., 222 Miss 260, 76 So2D 212; Brown v. Asheville
Electric Light Co., 138 NC 533, 51 SE 62.

A number of courts.

have held that power poles and transmission lines are an
additional servitude even where the public has a qualified
fee in the street for street purposes.

Callen v. Columbus

Electric Light Co., 66 Ohio St 166, 64 NE 141.
In one instance, even where the power company acquired
the right to string wires along the side of a highway through,
eminent domain, it was held to be an additional burden on the
servient estate.

Such additional burden thereby interfered

with the fee owner's raising of crops thereon, thus entitling\
the fee owner to damages.

Otter Tail Power Co. v. Von Bank.

72 ND 497, 8 NW 2d 599.
Again amplifing the right of the fee owner to receive
damages is Carpenter v. Capitol Electric, supra, where it was
held that the owner of the fee may demand damages when a power
company erects poles and strings transmission lines for its
own counnercial purposes.

Likewise, where the landowner had

previously granted to the electric company an easement for the
purpose of constructing and maintaining power lines, the
power company, subsequently authorized the local municipality
to attach wires and appurtenances to the power company's poles
In this instance the court held that the additional lines of
the municipality, with a corresponding right to enter upon

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
12
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

lands for maintenance purposes, placed an additional burden
on owner's land without his consent, thus entitling the
owner to compensation.

Therefore, any additional burden upon

a grant of an easement entitles the landowner to just
compensation.

Grimes v. Virginia Electric and Power Company,

96 SE2d 713.
In giving grounds for relief or damages, a few courts
have held that should the easement exceed his rights either
in the manner or in the extent of it's use, the easement owner
becomes a trespasser to the extent of the unathorized use.
Adams v. Winnett, 25 Tenn App 276, 156 DE2d 353.

Raven Red

Ash Coal v. Ball, 185 VA 534, 39 SE2d 231.
''

POINT I I
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR
WHEN IT RULED THAT THE PUBLIC THOROUGHFARE
INCLUDED THE ENTIRE FEE FOR PUBLIC USE AS
STATED IN PARAGRAPH 4, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.~

In the brief to the Trial Court by the Defendant, CALIFORNIA
PACIFIC, the counsel makes a point that a highway is deemed to
have been dedicated when it is used for a period of 10 years
as per U.C.A. 27-12-89 (1953, as amended).

U.C.A. 27-12-89

merely refers to a "thoroughfare for the public use" and not
to a permanent installation for commercial gains or personal
profit.

The word "thoroughfare" was defined as a place or

way through which there is passing or travel.

.

It became a

"public thoroughfare" when the public acquired a general
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right of passage.

Morris v. Blunt, 49 U 243, 161 P. 1127.

U.C.A. 27-12-101 (1953, as amended) reads as follows:
"TITLE TO PROPERTY ACQUIRED BY STATE. Title to
real property acquired by the state road conunission
or the counties, cities and towns, either by gift,
agreement, exchange, purchase, condemnation or
otherwise, for highway rights-of-way or other
highway purposes, may be in fee simple or any lesser
estate or interest. A transfer of land bounded
by a public highway on a right-of-way for which
the public has only an easement passes the
title of the person whose estate is transferred to
the middle of the highway." (Emphasis added)
By reading both U.C.A. 27-12-101 and U.C.A. 27-12-89
(1953, as amended) , it is clear that the

intent of the State

Legislature was that any implied dedication after a period
of 10 years use by the public, is merely a dedication to the
public of the right of thoroughfare or passage and cannot
constitute a dedication of the entire fee interest in the

I
I

property of the abutting owner over which the easement exists!
If it is the premise by the Trial Court and Defendant, .
CALIFORNIA PACIFIC, that the entire fee is to be dedicated af*
a 10-year period, it could also be held that, in an area withu
this State where there are many miles of roads similar to the
road which is the subject of this action, over lands that are
subject to oil and hydrocarbon deposits, by the dedication of
the entire fee under U.C.A. 27-12-89 (1953, as amended), any
revenues derived from the production and sale of said minerali
would belong to the public by reason of such dedication of
fee of the thoroughfare for public use.

thl

Profits from mineral!
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and those of a utility placing a power line for commercial
gains are similar in that they are personal profit.

It is

hard to conceive that the State Legislature intended that
more than the right to passage and thoroughfare was included
in U.C.A. 27-12-89 (1953, as amended), rather than the
entire fee interest as presented by the Trial Court and the
Defendant Utility Company, and the State Legislature did
in fact spell out the title to fee of an abutting owner in
U.C.A. 27-12-101 (1953, as amended).

If the intent were that

the entire fee were to pass, this would constitute the taking of
a person's property without just compensation, thereby
depriving a person of his or her due process of law as
guaranteed by the Constitutions of the United States of
America and the State of Utah.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR ,
WHEN IT RULED THAT POWER LINES OF THE
DEFENDANT FOR PERSONAL PROFIT WAS FOR THE
PUBLIC BENEFIT AS STATED IN PARAGRAPH 6,
CONCLUSION OF LAW BY THE TRIAL COURT.
If the power line in question are for the purpose of
aiding in travel for the public over this section of highway,
it could be said that this installation was for the "Public
Benefit".

However, in trial by the lower court, it was

determined that the installation of the power poles and
lines was for the Defendant.

CALIFORNIA PACIFIC's use

for profit and in no way benefited the thoroughfare or highway.
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The erection of poles and wires by an eletric company, not
for the purpose of lighting public way and places, but for tt
purposes of supplying light to individuals and firms in the
transaction of its own corporate and commercial business,
constitutes an additional easement or servitude on the
highway, for which the owner of the fee may demand

compensati~

Carpenter v. Capitol Electric, supra.
CONCLUSION
In view of all the foregoing, and the equities which
overwhelmingly preponderate in Plaintiff's favor:
1.

This Court should reverse the Judgment of the Trial I

Court and remand the case with instructions to order the

I

I

Defendant, CALIFORNIA PACIFIC to remove its pole line and
wires from the property of the Plaintiff;
2.

The Trial Court should be instructed to award

damages to the Plaintiff for the period of time that the
Defendant,

CALIFORNIA PACIFIC has trespassed upon the

property of the Plaintiffs;
3.

This Court should order the Trial Court to enjoin

and restrain the Defendant, COUNTY OF IRON from further
authorizing the expansion or modification of public thorough·
fares acquired by prescriptive right or by U.C.A. 27-12-89
(1953, as amended), unless authorized by the abutting legal
owner of the fee; or unless proper condemnation procedures
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are employed.
4.

Instruct the Trial Court to Order the Defendants

to pay all cost incurred by the Plaintiff in this action.
DATED:~~-November

1979.
Respectfully submitted.

JESS W. PICKETT
Attorney pro se
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